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TORTS-WRONGFUL DEATH-A Viable Fetus Is a
"Person" under the New Mexico Wrongful Death Statute:
Salazar v. St. Vincent Hospital

I. INTRODUCTION

In Salazar v. St. Vincent Hospital,' the court addressed the issue of
whether there was a right of recovery, under the New Mexico wrongful
death statute, 2 for the wrongful death of a viable fetus. The New Mexico
Court of Appeals upheld the plaintiff's wrongful death claims,' finding
that the legislature which enacted the New Mexico wrongful death statute
in 1882 intended to include a viable fetus within the meaning of the word
"person" as it was used in that statute.
This Note will discuss the Salazar decision in light of the history of
claims for the wrongful death of an unborn child and will examine conflicting decisions reached by other state courts which have addressed the
issue of whether there is a right of recovery for such claims. The Note
will also consider the Salazarholding in light of the United States Supreme
Court's definition of the word "person" in Roe v. Wade.4 In Roe, the
Court upheld a woman's right to have an abortion during the first trimester
of pregnancy, on the ground that she had a right to privacy under the
fourteenth amendment.
1. 95 N.M. 150, 619 P.2d 826 (Ct. App. 1980), cert. quashed, Sept. 30, 1980.
2. N.M. Stat. Ann. §41-2-1 (1978):
Whenever the death of a person shall be caused by the wrongful act, neglect
or default of another, although such death shall have been caused under such
circumstances as amount in law to a felony, and the act, or neglect, or default,
is such as would, if death had not ensued, have entitled the party injured to
maintain an action and recover damages in respect thereof, then, and in every
such case, the person who, or the corporation which, would have been liable, if
death had not ensued, shall be liable to an action for damages, notwithstanding
the death of the person injured.
N.M. Stat. Ann. § 41-2-3 (1978) provides in part:
Every such action as mentioned in Section 42-2-I NMSA 1978 shall be brought
by and in the name . . . of the personal representative . . . of such deceased

person, and the jury in every action may give such damages, compensatory and
exemplary, as they shall deem fair and just, taking into consideration the pecuniary
injury . . . resulting from such death to the surviving party . . . entitled to the

judgment ...and also having regard to the mitigating or aggravating circumstances attending such wrongful act, neglect, or default.
These statutes were enacted in 1882.
3. 95 N.M. at 154, 619 P.2d at 830.
4. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
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1I. STATEMENT OF THE CASE
In Salazar, the plaintiff individually sought damages for the alleged
negligence and malpractice of the defendant hospital and doctors in treating her vaginal bleeding.' Those claims were not dealt with on appeal.
The plaintiff, as personal representative of the estate of her fetus, also
sought damages for the wrongful death of the fetus.6 The plaintiff was
seven and one-half months pregnant at the time of the treatment by
defendants which allegedly caused the death of the fetus. 7 The trial court
dismissed the plaintiff's wrongful death claims on the ground that they
failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted.' After determining that a viable fetus is a "person" as that word is used in the New
Mexico wrongful death statute, 9 the court of appeals reversed the trial
court, holding that there is a right of recovery for the wrongful death of
a viable fetus in New Mexico.
III. ANALYSIS AND DISCUSSION
A. The Salazar Decision
1. The majority opinion
The Salazar court first framed the issue as "whether damages may be
recovered, in New Mexico, for the wrongful death of a viable fetus. "'0
The court of appeals accepted the plaintiff's allegations of viability as
being true for the purpose of considering the wrongful death claims."
The court first looked to the common law for guidance and found that
there was no right of recovery for wrongful death of anyone under the
common law as it existed in New Mexico in 1882.12
Finding no help in the common law, the court then turned to the New
Mexico wrongful death statute. The court noted that the statute applies
5. 95 N.M. at 150, 619 P.2d at 826.
6. Id.
7. Id. at 151, 619 P.2d at 827. The fetus was alive at the time of the alleged negligence and
malpractice but was stillborn. Id.
8. Id. at 150-51, 619 P.2d at 826-27.
9. Id. at 154, 619 P.2d at 830. See N.M. Stat. Ann. §41-2-1 (1978), supra note 2: "Whenever
the death of a person shall be caused ..."(emphasis added).
10. 95 N.M. at 151, 619 P.2d at 827.
11. "Viability" is generally regarded as being the point at which a fetus is capable of remaining
alive, although outside the mother's womb. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. at 160. In Roe, the Court stated
that "viability is usually placed at about seven months (28 weeks) but may occur earlier, even at
24 weeks." ld.
12. 95 N.M. at 151, 619 P.2d at 827. The court noted that the common law rule was an ancient
one and that in Ickes v. Brimhall, 42 N.M. 412, 79 P.2d 942 (1938), the New Mexico Supreme
Court "affirmed the existence of the common-law rule in New Mexico." 95 N.M. at 151, 619 P.2d
at 827.
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to the death of a "person" and phrased the issue as whether the word
"person," as used in the statute, "included a viable fetus."' 3 The court
again considered the common law to decide whether a viable fetus is a
"person" under the statute. The court found that under tort law there was
no recovery for the wrongful death of a fetus. 4 In addition, the court
15
found that the property fights of a fetus depended on its being born.
The court then turned to the criminal law, but found that commentators
disagreed on whether the killing of a fetus at common law was a felony,
a crime short of a felony, or not a crime of any kind.' 6
Because the common law provided no guidance, the court then considered whether the plaintiff's claim that the status of a viable fetus as a
"person" had been established by contemporary common law. 7 Although
noting that courts in other states had used contemporary common law as
a basis for their decision, the Salazar court declined to do so, stating that
it would "make a mockery of legislative intent. " 8 Instead, the court said
that it must determine the enacting legislature's intent in 1882 when that
legislature used the word "person.""
In determining the enacting legislature's intent, the court first assumed
that the legislature knew that the common law offered no protection to a
fetus.2 ° Because the court must "presume that the legislature was informed
as to existing law, not only statutory law, but common law," 2 ' the Salazar
court then concluded that the legislature knew of criminal statutes in
effect in 1882.22 Although the court never said it was construing an
ambiguous statute, it looked at two criminal statutes which dealt with the
13. Id. at 152, 619 P.2d at828.
14. Id.
15. Id. Cf. note 80, infra, where a court compared the property interests of the unborn to the
right
tolife.
16. 95 N.M. at 152, 619 P.2d at 828.
17. Id. If a court relies on contemporary common law, itconstrues legislation on the basis of the
contemporary meaning of words used by the enacting legislature instead of on the actual intent of
the enacting legislature as it existed then. Id. at 152-53, 619 P.2d at 829.
18. Id. at 153, 619 P.2d at 829.
19. Id.
20. Id.
21. Id. See also Bettini v.City of Las Cruces, 82 N.M. 633, 635, 485 P.2d 967, 969 (1971).
22. 95 N.M. at153, 619 P.2d at829. The pertinent criminal statutes then in effect were 185354 N.M. Laws, act28, ch. 3, §§ 10 and I!:
Sec. 10. The willful
killing
of an unborn infant child, by any injury to the
mother of such child, which would be murder ifitresulted inthe death of such
mother, shall be deemed murder inthe third
degree.
Sec. 11. Every person who shall administer to any woman pregnant with a
quick child, any medicine, drug, or substance whatever, or shall use or employ
any instrument or other means, with intent thereby to destroy such child, unless
the same shall have been necessary to preserve the life of such mother, and shall
have been advised by a physician to be necessary for such purpose, shall, in case
the death of such child or such mother be thereby produced, be deemed guilty
of murder in the third degree.
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willful killing of an unborn child. The sections were entitled, "Of Offences Against Lives and Persons" and stated that the act of killing an
"unborn infant child" or a "quick child" was murder in the third degree. 23
Due to the existence of these criminal statutes, the Salazarcourt concluded
that the 1882 legislature knew that a fetus was protected by the legislation
dealing with lives and persons.24
After determining the legislature's knowledge, the court found that
actions for civil liability for willful criminal conduct were recognized in
1882.25 Once the court established that it was a criminal offense to kill
a viable fetus in 1882, and that there was civil liability for such an offense,
it concluded that the 1882 legislature intended to provide a remedy for
the death of a fetus in the wrongful death statute. 26 The court relied on
Moragne v. States Marine Lines, Inc.2 7 in reasoning that when there is
recovery for violations causing injury, it is a remedial matter to allow
recovery for violations causing death.
The Salazar court next reasoned that the 1882 legislature applied the
same meaning to "infant child" and "quick child"-that of "person,"
because the criminal statutes were entitled "Lives and Persons." Although
the criminal statutes use the terms "unborn infant child" and "quick
child," it is not clear they mean the same as a viable fetus. More likely
"quick child" refers to an earlier stage than viability, 2 while the exact
meaning of "unborn infant child" is ambiguous. 29 The court went on to
equate viable fetus with "person" because the criminal statutes were
entitled "lives and persons." 3 ° This argument is weak in light of the
finding in Albuquerque v. Campbell,3' that headings to statutes are "merely
descriptive and intended as aids in the use of the statutes." 3 2 Finally, the
23. Id. The offense was upgraded to second degree murder in 1907. N.M. Laws, ch. 36, §§5
and 6 (1907). Id.
24. 95 N.M. at 153-54, 619 P.2d at 829-30.
25. Id. at 154, 619 P.2d at 830. The court noted that civil liability was based on criminal conduct,
"[A] wrongful act punishable as an offense, does not preclude exemplary damages therefor in a
civil act sounding in tort." Id. (citing Colbert v. Journal Publishing Co., 19 N.M. 156, 168,142
P.146, 150 (1914)).
26. 95 N.M. at 154, 619 P.2d at 830.
27. 398 U.S. 375 (1970). In Moragne, the Court recognized a cause of action for wrongful death
under general maritime law. Id. at 401. The court reasoned that "nothing in ordinary notions of
justice suggests that a violation should be nonactionable simply because it was serious enough to
cause death." Id. at 381.
28. "Quick" child: "one that has developed so that it moves within the mother's womb;" Black's
Law Dictionary 122 (5th ed. 1979). Quickening: "The first motion of the fetus in the womb felt by
the mother, occurring usually about the middle of the term of pregnancy." Id.
29. In addition, the criminal statutes deal with the "willful" killing of an unborn child, whereas
civil liability for a killing under the wrongful death statute deals with negligence.
30. 95 N.M. at 153-54, 619 P.2d at 829-30.
31. 68 N.M. 75, 358 P.2d 698 (1961).
32. Id. at 78, 358 P.2d at 700. In Campbell, the court was considering a statute which provided
for liability insurance on all vehicles owned by the state.
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Salazar court should have looked at the entire criminal statute to see how
the term "person" was used.33 The court would have found that "person"
and "human being" were used in the criminal statute to describe those
infant child"
who were already born; the more specific terms of "unborn
34
and "quick child" were used to describe the unborn.
2. The dissent
The dissent in Salazar did not directly attack the weakness in the
majority's analysis of the criminal and the wrongful death statutes. 35
Instead it developed a four-pronged argument containing some of the
traditional reasons for denying recovery in similar claims. The dissent
argued that 1) legislative enactments amending the wrongful death statutes
are preferable to judicial legislation;36 2)the New Mexico courts have
generally followed the views of the Missouri Supreme Court and that
court denied recovery in State ex rel. Hardin v. Sanders;37 3) there is no
room for construction "[w]here the terms of a statute are plain and unambiguous;" 38 and 4) there are serious problems as to proof of damages. 39
The dissent's first argument is weak. The court was not necessarily
legislating, but was interpreting ambiguous or unclear terms in the wrongful death statute. The court in Salazar did not necessarily create a new
cause of action for recovery of damages for the wrongful death of a viable
fetus. It merely interpreted an ambiguous old statute to include such
recovery.' Second, the dissent's reliance on Sanders is questionable because the Sanders court reached its decision by distinguishing an earlier
case where the Missouri Supreme Court had suggested that a viable fetus
is a "person." 4 The Sanders court found that any such statement "was
33. In State ex rel. Newsome v. Alarid, 90 N.M. 790, 794, 568 P.2d 1236, I24O (1977), the
court said, "[tihe entire statute is to be read as a whole so that each provision may be considered
in its relation to every other part."
34. See note 22 supra, 1853-54 N.M. Laws, act 28, ch. 3, §§3, 8, 10, 11, 12, 15, 34.
35. Judge Sutin dissented. 95 N.M. at 155, 619 P.2d at 831.
36. 95 N.M. at 156, 619 P.2d at 832.
37. Id. at 157, 619 P.2d at 833. In State ex rel. Hardin v. Sanders, 538 S.W.2d 336 (Mo. 1976),
the court held that an unborn child was not a "person" within the wrongful death statute until there
had been a live birth. Id. at 338-39.
38. 95 N.M. at 158, 619 P.2d at 834 (citing Hendricks v. Hendricks, 55 N.M. 51, 226 P.2d 464
(1950)).
39. 95 N.M. at 159-60, 619 P.2d at 835-36.
40. See M & M Rental Tools, Inc. v. Milchem, Inc. 94 N.M. 449, 612 P.2d 241 (1980), where
the court created a new cause of action in New Mexico for tortious interference with contractual
relations. If judicial creation of an entirely new cause of action is not "legislating," then interpreting
a statute should not be considered legislating.
41. 538 S.W.2d at 337. In the earlier case, Steggall v. Morris, 363 Mo. 1224, 258 S.W.2d 577
(1953), the court argued that because common law principles authorize courts to compel a tortfeasor
to compensate a person who has been injured through the tortfeasor's negligence, it follows that an
unborn viable child, injured through the tortfeasor's negligence, should be able to maintain an action
in tort after birth. Id. at 579 (emphasis added). The Steggall court seemed to be equating the terms
"person" and "unborn viable child."
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dictum and not a part of the decision and hence need not be followed. " 4 2
Third, as the Salazar dissent noted, "a majority of the appellate courts
of the country" ' 43 have issued opinions regarding the right of action fdr
the wrongful death of an unborn child.' Such a large number of controversies over the terms in the wrongful death statutes indicates that the
language is neither plain nor unambiguous. Furthermore, one case suggested that one reason why the wrongful death statutes are ambiguous is
because legislators enacting such statutes probably never thought about
whether they were creating an action for the death of a fetus. 45 Fourth,
as will be discussed, damages are provable. Although the majority reached
the right decision, it did so by relying on a weak analysis of criminal
statutes. The dissent's analysis is equally weak. A look at the history of
the unborn and conflicting state court opinions shows that only the application of Roe will result in a sensible consensus.
B. History of the Law of Wrongful Death of the Unborn
Most courts first consider the development of the cause of action for
the wrongful death of the unborn before deciding whether there is a right
of recovery. 46 As the majority in Salazar noted, wherever the common
law existed, there was no right of recovery for wrongful death.47 State
legislatures enacted wrongful death statutes in response to the harsh common law rule. These statutes generally provide that a person who causes
the wrongful death of another person shall be liable in an action for
damages and that the representative of the deceased shall be awarded
such damages. 48 The New Mexico wrongful death statute, enacted in
1882 and amended in 1891, contains such provisions. 49
Four major cases established the history of the cause of action for
42. 538 S.W.2d at 339. The Sanders court conceded that there was some indication that the
Steggall court believed a viable fetus was a person within the meaning of the wrongful death statute.
The court did not explain why it found the Steggall language to be dictum.
43. 95 N.M. at 157, 619 P.2d at 833.
44. The courts are hopelessly split. See Eich v. Town of Gulf Shores, 293 Ala. 95, 300 So. 2d
354 (1974) and Presley v. Newport Hosp., 117 R.I. 177, 365 A.2d 748 (1976) (action is maintainable);
Kilmer v. Hicks, 22 Ariz. App. 552, 529 P.2d 706 (1974) and Justus v. Atchison, 19 Cal.3d 564,
139 Cal. Rptr. 97, 565 P.2d 122 (1977) (action is not maintainable).
-,
227 N.E.2d 20, 24-25 (1971).In Britt, the
45. See Britt v. Sears, 150 Ind. App. 487,
court noted that the word "child" in the Indiana wrongful death statute could have the same meaning
as "child" in the phrase "with child" and held that a full term fetus was a "child" within the
.
277 N.E.2d at 24-25, 27. The Britt court
..
meaning of the statute. Id. at
was examining a statute that was enacted in 1881. The New Mexico statute was enacted in 1882.
46. See Presley v. Newport Hosp., 117 R.I. 177, 365 A.2d 748 (1976); Britt v. Sears, 150 Ind.
App. 487, 277 N.E.2d 20 (1971); Rainey v. Horn, 221 Miss. 269, 72 So. 2d 434 (1954).
47. 95 N.M. at 151, 619 P.2d at 827.
48. Malone, The Genesis of Wrongful Death, 17 Stan. L. Rev. 1043, 1044 (1965).
49. 95 N.M. at 151, 619 P.2d at 827. The "1891 amendment carried forward the substance of
...the 1882 Act." Id. See note 2, supra, for the text of the statute.
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wrongful death of the unborn.5" The first decision, Dietrich v. Northampton,5 denied a right of recovery for a child who, due to an accident,
only survived a short time after birth. The Dietrich court held that an
infant who died before it was able to live separately from its mother was
not a "person" and did not have standing in court.52 In Allaire v. St.
Luke's Hospital,5 3 the majority followed Dietrich and denied recovery,
but the dissenting judge argued that a fetus was a legal entity capable of
sustaining an actionable injury.54 The other two decisions marked the

beginning of the trend toward recovery. In Bonbrest v. Kotz, 55 the court
held that a child who was injured while being removed from its mother's
womb and who had demonstrated its capability to survive by surviving
for a short time, was a viable child and had standing to maintain an action
for its injury. The court in Verkennes v. Corniea,56 also held that there
was a cause of action when a viable fetus is injured and stillborn. Since
1949, when Verkennes was decided, twenty-six states and the District of
Columbia have decided to allow recovery. Eleven states deny recovery,
and the remaining states have not dealt with the issue. 57
C. Contrasting Positions Taken by Other State Courts
The Salazar court's rationale is not supported by the rationales underlying the decisions reached by other state courts which have addressed
the issue of whether wrongful death statutes support a right of recovery
for the death of an unborn child. These decisions differ from Salazar and
vary from each other on both sides of the issue. 8
1) Reasons for denial of recovery
In State ex rel. Hardin v. Sanders,59 the court held that a fetus is not
a "person" within the wrongful death statute until there is live birth. The
court reasoned that if the legislature had intended to create such a cause
50. The Salazar dissent discussed two of the cases which favored its position, Dietrich v. Northampton, 138 Mass. 14, 52 Am. R. 242 (1884) and Allaire v. St. Luke's Hospital, 184 I11.359,
56 N.E. 638 (1900). See Reilly, Torts-Wrongful Death-A Viable Fetus is a "Person"forPurposes
of the Rhode Island Wrongful Death Act, 46 U. Cin. L. Rev. 266, 267-69 (1977).
51. 138 Mass. 14, 52 Am. R. 242 (1884).
52. Id. at 17, 52 Am. R. at 245. Cf. Bonbrest v. Kotz, note 55 infra, in which the court permitted
recovery because a child had survived a few minutes outside the womb.
53. 184 Ill. 359, 56 N.E. 638 (1900).
, 56 N.E. at 641-42.
54. Id. at __
55. 65 F.Supp. 138 (D.D.C. 1946).
56. 229 Minn. 365, 38 N.W.2d 838 (1949).
57. See Annot., 84 A.L.R.3d 411, 422 (1978 and Supp. 1981); Kader, The Law of Tortious
PrenatalDeath Since Roe v. Wade, 45 Mo. L. Rev. 639, 644-45 (1980) [hereinafter cited as Kader].
58. As will be discussed, an application of the Supreme Court's decision and analysis in Roe v.
Wade could provide a single standard for granting recovery under wrongful death legislation, thereby
diminishing the number of conflicting decisions. See text accompanying notes 98-129, infra.
59. 538 S.W.2d 336 (Mo. 1976).
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6
of action, it would have specifically stated such an intention in the statute. 0
The Salazar court rejected this argument because the argument assumes
that wrongful death statutes were not intended to have prospective application and that recovery would only be permitted for causes of action
known to exist when the statute was enacted. 6 ' Courts denying a right of
action also argue that because the common law denied recovery for any
wrongful death, statutes should not be construed as effecting any change
in the common law beyond that which is clearly indicated.6 2 In contrast,
the Salazar court found that because the common law denied recovery,
it would turn to the wrongful death statute .63
Courts which deny recovery also contend that there is no possible
evidence by which pecuniary loss can be proved when the deceased is a
fetus.' The Salazar majority did not discuss the issue of damages. The
dissent, however, argued that determining compensatory damages, including pecuniary losses resulting from the death of a fetus, would require
speculative, expert testimony. 65 The dissent also argued that even if damages were based on the present worth of the life of the decedent, neither
courts, experts, nor medical science could create a "present worth of
life" to the estate of an unborn child.' Although some courts have found
67
that such determinations might be arbitrary or even impossible, one
commentator argues that the amount of pecuniary loss in the case of a
stillborn child can be determined on the basis of factors similar to those
considered when an infant dies .68

60. Id. at 338-39.
61. 95 N.M. at 152, 619 P.2d at 828. The court agreed with the plaintiff's argument that the

statute was "general, prospective and remedial." Id.
62. See Justus v. Atchison, 19 Cal.3d 564, 139 Cal. Rptr. 97, 565 P.2d 122 (1977), in which
the court found that when the legislature enacted the wrongful death statute, it intended to regulate
the entire question of wrongful death, "thus cutting off all future judicial initiative." Id. at 574, 139
Cal. Rptr. at 103, 565 P.2d at 128.
63. 95 N.M. at 151, 619 P.2d at 827.
64. See, e.g., Justus v. Atchison, 19 Cal.3d 564, 139 Cal. Rptr. 97, 565 P.2d 122 (1977) and
Gay v. Thompson, 266 N.C. 394, 146 S.E.2d 425 (1966).
65. 95 N.M. at 159, 619 P.2d at 835.
66. Id.
67. See Fowler v. Woodward, 244 S.C. 608, 138 S.E.2d 42 (1964). In Fowler. the court held
that a viable child is a "person" before separation from the body of its mother, and that a cause of
action for tortious injury to that child arises upon infliction of that injury. The court concluded, that
"[i]t is beside the point that the extent of damages might be difficult, or even impossible, to establish
138 S.E.2d at 44.
prior to birth." Id. at 68. See Kruger, Wrongful Death and the Unborn:An Examination of Recovery After Roe v. Wade,
13 J. Fain. L. 99, 106-07 (1973-74). Such factors include the "child's age, sex, ambition, physical
and mental characteristics, parents' social and economic status, and employment of other children
in the family." Id. As Kruger notes, "[w]hile not all these factors are present in a stillbom child,
it would appear that enough factors are present to enable a jury to calculate the pecuniary value of
his life to his parents with little more speculation than is used in calculating the pecuniary loss of
an infant child." Id.
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2) Reasons for permitting recovery
Courts permitting recovery have generally found that a fetus is a "person" within the meaning of the statutory language.69 Courts denying
recovery argue that the legislature did not intend to include a fetus within
the meaning of person. 7" In Salazar the court had to rely upon a criminal
statute in its attempt to find the legislative intent behind the wrongful
death statute. 71 The court drew a tenuous connection between that statute
and the intent of the legislature when it enacted the wrongful death
statute.72 Some courts have stressed viability as a reason for finding the
fetus to be a "person," because it is capable of staying alive outside the
mother. 73 The dissent in Salazar contended that courts which equated
viability to personhood "redefined the word 'person' as commonly understood in the 19th century ' 74 and imputed a legal personality to an unborn
child because birth is an artificial and unreasonable demarcation of a right
of action.
Other courts have not found "personhood," but have relied on other
reasons for permitting recovery. In Chrisafogeorgisv. Brandenberg,7 5 the
court had previously permitted a right of action for a child born alive.
The Chrisafogeorgis court used that decision as a basis for permitting
recovery for a stillborn child.76 In Green v. Smith, 77 the court noted that
the action on behalf of a child born alive is based on a common law
action for damages. In contrast, the court in Justus v. Atchison78 noted
that a cause of action for wrongful death was a "pure creature of statute. "7 9
Other courts rely on statutes which protect property interests of the unborn
by providing for the appointment of a guardian ad litem. 8° As the Court
69. See Fowler v. Woodward, note 67 supra. See also Chrisafogeorgis v. Brandenberg, 55 Ill.
2d 368, 304 N.E.2d 88 (1973), in which the court found that the critical stage of "person" is when
304 N.E.2d
-,
a child is capable of remaining alive, although separate from its mother. Id. at
at 92. The wrongful death statutes in both Fowler and Chrisafogeorgisare very similar to the New
Mexico wrongful death statute.
70. See Presley v. Newport Hosp., 117 R.I. 177, 365 A.2d 748 (1976) (dissenting opinion);
O'Neill v. Morse, 385 Mich. 130, 188 N.W.2d 785 (1971) (dissenting opinion).
71. 95 N.M. at 152, 619 P.2d at 828.
72. See text accompanying notes 25-34 supra.
73. See note 67 supra.
74. 95 N.M. at 156, 619 P.2d at 832.
75. See Chrisafogeorgis v. Brandenberg, note 69, supra.
76. The Chrisafogeorgiscourt found that allowing a right of recovery for a fetus was a "reasonable
and natural development of the holding" from its earlier decision, Amann v. Faidy, 415 Ill. 422,
114 N.E.2d 412 (1953), involving a child who survived.
, 377 N.E.2d 37, 38 (1978).
77. 71 ll.2d 501,
78. 19 Cal.3d 564, 565 P.2d 122 (1977), 139 Cal. Rptr. 97.
, 565 P.2d at 129, 139 Cal. Rptr. at 104.
79. Id. at __
80. O'Neill v. Morse, 385 Mich. 130, 188 N.W.2d 785 (1977). In O'Neill, the court argued that
"[i]f property interests of unborn persons are protected by the law, how much more solicitous should
-,
188 N.W.2d
the law be of the first unalienable right of man-the right to life itself?." Id. at
at 788.
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in Roe recognized, however, "[p]erfection of the interests involved...
has generally been contingent upon live birth. "8 Other courts have said
that denial of recovery rewards the tortfeasor "for his severity in inflicting
the injury." 2 The Salazar dissent rejected public policy reasons that
argued for a right of action because they "do not so far outweigh those
which deny the right as to call for judicial legislation on the question." 83
D. Salazar in Light of Roe v. Wade
In Roe v. Wade, the Supreme Court addressed the question of whether
a fetus was a "person" under the fourteenth amendment for abortion
purposes.8 4 The Roe Court arrived at a definition of "person" which is
substantially different from that applied in Salazar.
In Roe, John and Mary Roe alleged that they were a childless couple
and that Mrs. Roe's doctor had advised against pregnancy due to Mrs.
Roe's medical disorder.85 The Roes stated that upon medical advice, Mrs.
Roe had discontinued birth control pills. They also decided that if she
became pregnant, Mrs. Roe would terminate the pregnancy by an abortion.86 Mrs. Roe became pregnant and the Texas criminal abortion laws
prevented her from procuring an abortion.87 The Roes attacked the Texas
abortion statutes on the ground that they invaded a pregnant woman's
constitutional right to choose to terminate her pregnancy.88 They further
contended that the concept of personal liberty embodied in the fourteenth
amendment's due process clause is "protected by the Bill of Rights" or
-89"8. The
is a right "reserved to the people by the Ninth Amendment
Supreme Court found that the right to an abortion was within the penumbra
of the right of privacy protected by the fourteenth amendment. 9° The
Court went on to balance the state's interest in protecting prenatal life
against the mother's right to privacy in deciding to terminate the pregnancy. 9' The Court found that it did not have to determine when life
began; as long as there was the potential for life, the state had an interest
beyond that of protecting the mother's health.92
81. 410 U.S. at 162.
-,
300 So. 2d 354, 355 (1974). The Eich
82. Eich v. Town of Gulf Shores, 293 Ala. 95,
court thought that it "would be bizarre, indeed, to hold that the greater the harm inflicted the better
the opportunity for exoneration of the defendant." Id.
83. 95 N.M. at 156, 619 P.2d at 832.
84. 410 U.S. at 156-57.
85. Id. at 121.
86. Id.
87. Id. The statutes, Tex. Stat. Ann. §§ 1191-94, 1196 (1935), made it a crime to procure an
abortion or attempt one unless to save the life of the mother.
88. 410 U.S. at 129.
89. Id.
90. Id. at 153.
91. Id. at 147-52.
92. Id. at 150.
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The Roe Court considered the argument, presented by the state, that
a fetus is a "person" within the language and meaning of the fourteenth
amendment and therefore has due process rights.93 In its attempt to define
"person," the Supreme Court first looked to the language of the fourteenth
amendment and then to other parts of the Constitution. It could not find
a definition of the word "person," but did find that the use of "person"
in various parts of the Constitution never indicated any prenatal application."
The Salazar court also considered whether a fetus was a "person"
within the language and meaning of its wrongful death statute for the
purposes of claims arising under the Act. 95 The Salazar court first looked
to the terms of the statute and rejected the plaintiff's contention that
"person" included "fetus" as established by contemporary common law. 96
The court then looked at the relevant criminal statutes in its attempt to
define the word "person." Unlike the Supreme Court, the Salazar court
found an indication of intent to include a fetus within the meaning of the
word "person" in the criminal statutes which were in effect on the date
the wrongful death legislation was passed. 97 In light of the Supreme

93. Id. at 156-57.
94. Id. The Court stated:
The Constitution does not define "person" in so many words. Section 1 of the
Fourteenth Amendment contains three references to "person." The first, in defining "citizens," speaks of "persons bom or naturalized in the United States."
The word also appears both in the Due Process Clause and in the Equal Protection
Clause. "Person" is used in other places in the Constitution: in the listing of
qualifications for Representatives and Senators... in the Apportionment Clause
.
in the Migration and Importation provision . .; in the Emolument Clause
the Electors provisions and the superseded Fugitive Slave Clause 3; and
.in
in the Fifth, Twelfth and Twenty-second Amendments, as well as in §§ 2 and 3
of the Fourteenth Amendment. But in nearly all these instances, the use of the
word is such that it has application only postnatally. None indicates, with any
assurance, that it has any possible pre-natal application.
Id. at 157.
95. 95 N.M. at 152, 619 P.2d at 828. The court had to consider the definition of "person" because
the "statute, by its language, applied to the death of a 'person.' " Id. Although the Supreme Court
was considering the Constitution and the Salazar court was considering a statute, both courts were
trying to define the term "person" by determining its use in other parts of the Constitution or statute.
96. Id.
97. Id. at 153-54, 619 P.2d at 829-30. In light of this finding, the Salazar court concluded that
the 1882 legislature knew that a viable fetus was protected by legislation dealing with lives and
persons. Id. If the court had looked at the whole criminal statute, it would have found, as the United
States Supreme Court found, that "person" was used to describe those who were already bom.
Cf. Harman v. Daniels, 525 F. Supp. 798 (W.D. Va. 1981), where a United States District Court
held that a fetus is not a "person" or "citizen" who may, after birth, maintain an action under 42
U.S.C. § 1983 (1976). In Harman the fetus was allegedly injured by a police officer during the
arrest of her pregnant mother. The district court acknowledged a recent Louisiana Supreme Court
decision which allowed recovery for the wrongful death of a fetus and agreed with the plaintiff that
even if a fetus is not constitutionally entitled as a "person" to claim certain rights, Congress can
extend protection to unborn children by appropriate legislation. Nevertheless, the court found no
such protection in the Civil Rights Act. Id. at 802.
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Court's analysis of the fourteenth amendment to the United States Constitution and the application of that analysis in the Roe decision, it appears
that the Salazar court applied faulty reasoning in finding that the legislative intent of the wrongful death statute was to include recovery for the
death of an unborn child.
E. Correlationbetween Salazar and Roe
Courts which have addressed the issue of recovery for the wrongful
death of an unborn child have dealt with Roe in a number of ways. Courts
which have denied recovery have emphasized the Supreme Court's finding
that a fetus is not a "person."' 98 Courts which have permitted recovery
have stressed the importance of the finding that the state has a compelling
interest in protecting fetal life. 99 Many other courts have not relied on
Roe at all in reaching their decisions. 0 The Salazarcourt virtually ignored
Roe, and cited to it only as an historical source with regard to the status
of a fetus.' 0'
The abortion decision and the wrongful death decisions need to be
correlated because 1) there is such diverse treatment of Roe by courts
deciding the wrongful death issue and 2) both the wrongful death and
the abortion statutes deal with the status of the unborn child. Such a
correlation would result in a cohesive theory regarding the rights of the
unborn and would allow courts to permit recovery with substantial and
persuasive authority. The analysis employed in Salazar demonstrates the
need for the courts to formulate a consistent approach which may be
applied in future cases which address similar issues.
Correlating the Supreme Court's holding on abortion with the wrongful
98. See Justus v. Atchison, 19 Cal.3d at __
, 565 P.2d at 130-31, 139 Cal. Rptr. at 10506. In Justus, the court cited Roe as authority for its argument that the treatment of a fetus as
equivalent to the born child is the exception rather than the rule. Id. See also Kilmer v. Hicks, 22
Ariz. App. 552, 529 P.2d 706 (1974), in which the court cited to the Roe finding that a fetus is not
a "person" within the meaning of the fourteenth amendment and held that a fetus is not a "person"
under the wrongful death statute. Id. at __
, 529 P.2d at 707-08.
99. See Presley v. Newport Hosp., 117 R.I. 177, 365 A.2d 748 (1976), in which the court noted
that "the Supreme Court's decision in Roe recognized that a state has such a compelling interest in
the protection of a fetal life after viability that it may proscribe nontherapeutic abortions during that
period." Id. at __
, 365 A.2d at 756. The Presley court held that the beneficiaries of the fetus
were entitled to bring an action for the wrongful death of a viable fetus.
100. See Stern v. Miller, 348 So. 2d 303 (Fla. 1977) (denied recovery for seven-month fetus);
Evans v. Olson, 550 P.2d 924 (Okla. 1976) (permitted recovery for viable fetus); Moen v. Hanson,
85 Wash. 2d 597, 537 P.2d 266 (1975) (permitted recovery foreight-month fetus); Mone v. Greyhound
Lines Inc., 368 Mass. 354, 331 N.E.2d 916 (1975) (permitted recovery for eight and one-half month
fetus); Pehrson v. Kistner, 301 Minn. 299, 222 N.W.2d 334 (1974) (permitted recovery for viable
fetus); Chrisafogeorgis v. Brandenberg, 55 I11.
2d 368, 304 N.E.2d 88 (1973) (permitted recovery
for nine-month fetus).
101. 95 N.M. at 152, 619 P.2d at 828. One commentator suggests that courts have reached
decisions without relying on Roe because it "was not a wrongful death case" and because "it did
not directly address the question of recovery for such." Kader, supra note 57, at 651.
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death decisions initially involves resolving the apparently conflicting definitions of "person." A close look at the Roe decision shows that such a
resolution is possible. The Supreme Court found that the word "person,"
as used in the fourteenth amendment, does not include the unborn. 0' 2 The
Court's reference to wrongful death recovery for the unborn and its statement that "the unborn have never been recognized in the law as persons
in the whole sense"' 0 3 are part of the Court's historical analysis, not its
holding. The Court did not hold that states must deny recovery for the
wrongful death of a fetus. The Court found that because a fetus represents
the potentiality of life, the state can assert an interest, subject to the
limitations imposed by the Court.
In addition, "person" can mean different things in different contexts.
For example, Professor Kader argued that in both its fourteenth amendment context and its wrongful death context, the word "person" is an
"attribution that bestows upon the annointed a legal personality entitled
to certain rights or benefits.'' Professor Kader also noted that a court
may hold that a viable fetus is a "person" for purposes of the wrongful
death statute but is not a "person" for purposes of the vehicular homicide
statute. 05 These arguments suggest that although the Supreme Court's
finding that a fetus is not a "person" appears to conflict with the holding
in Salazar and with other decisions permitting wrongful death recovery,
the finding of the Court in Roe "neither prohibits nor compels consistency
of interpretation of the meaning of 'person' as between the fourteenth
amendment and wrongful death statutes."'

If Roe does not preclude recovery for the wrongful death of a fetus
despite the different definitions of the word "person," two questions
remain. The first is whether Roe should ever be applied to the issue of
recovery for wrongful death of a fetus. The second is if Roe is to be
applied, whether it limits such recovery. Although in Roe the Supreme
Court did not directly address the question of recovery for the unborn,
it did consider the legal status of the unborn in relation to the abortion
102. 410 U.S. at 157.
103. Id. at 162.
104. Kader, supra note 57, at 657.
105. Kader, supra note 57, at 656-57 n. 94 (citing Note, Torts-Wrongful Death-A Viable Fetus
is a "Person"forPurposes of the Rhode Island Wrongful DeathAct, 46 U. Cin. L. Rev. 266 (1977)).
In State v. Dickinson, 23 Ohio App. 2d 259, 263 N.E.2d 253 (1970), the vehicular homicide case,
the court based its holding on the history of common law: "It is well settled that at common law
-,
263
an unborn fetus, viable or otherwise, could not be the subject of homicide." Id. at
N.E.2d at 255. In Stidam v. Ashmore, 109 Ohio App. 431, 167 N.E.2d 106 (1959), the court relied
on an earlier Ohio Supreme Court decision, Williams v. Marion Rapid Transit, Inc., 152 Ohio St.
114, 87 N.E.2d 334 (1949), in which the court held that a viable unborn child was a person. 109
Ohio App. at __
, 167 N.E.2d at 107.
106. Kader, supra note 57, at 657. The effect of such a conclusion is that courts no longer have
to struggle to define "person." This conclusion also eliminates courts' denying wrongful death
recovery based on the Supreme Court's definition of "person."
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statutes and other areas of the law.° 7 In light of its consideration of the
legal status of the unborn, the Roe decision logically provides guidance
in the wrongful death area.0 8 Furthermore, reliance upon the analysis
applied in Roe would enable state courts to formulate a coherent theory
regarding the status of the unborn.
While it appears that Roe is applicable to wrongful death actions, the
decision implicitly limits recovery to a fetus injured in the second and
third trimesters of pregnancy by establishing guidelines which limit the
state's interest in regulating abortions. The Court did not require the state
to assert an interest in protecting the health of the mother and the potentiality of life; but if states wish to assert such an interest, they must follow
the guidelines the Court proposed. 0 9 The Court stated that in the first
trimester of pregnancy, there is no state interest which can override the
woman's right to terminate her pregnancy. "0 The court found that in the
second trimester the state interest was strong enough to regulate abortion
precedures."' In the third trimester, the state interest is strong enough to
regulate and proscribe abortions. "2 The degree of state interest in protecting the potentiality of life from wrongful acts can and should be
correlated with the state's interest in regulating abortions.' 'I That is, the
state has an interest in protecting the fetus from injury and death during
the second and third trimesters of pregnancy, but cannot successfully
assert such an interest in the first trimester.
Application of the Court's reasoning in Roe v. Wade requires that both
abortion and wrongful death statutes recognize the state's interest in protecting the potentiality of life in the third trimester. In Roe, the Court
107. 410 U.S. at 161-63. The Court considered the legal status of the unborn in tort law and
property law. Id.
108. As one commentator asserted, "the challenge to the [Salazar court] can only be appreciated
in light of the reasoning .. .in Roe v. Wade." See Scales, Torts, 12 N.M. L. Rev. 481, 485 (1981).
In Salazar, the court had to justify its finding that "person," as it was used in the wrongful death
statute, included a fetus even though the statute was ambiguous. There was no support for that
definition in case law, and the court refused to give the word a contemporary meaning. 95 N.M. at
152-53, 619 P.2d at 828-29. The Roe analysis eliminates the need for such justification by providing
clear guidelines as to when a state can assert an interest under the wrongful death statute regardless
of its definition of "person." See notes 106 supra and 110-13 infra, and accompanying text.
109. 410 U.S. at 164. The Supreme Court noted that states have enacted criminal abortion laws
due to an interest in the areas of health and medical standards and in protecting prenatal life. Id. at
149-50.
110. Id. at 164.
111. Id.
112. Id. at 164-65.
113. In Chrisafogeorgis v. Brandenberg, supra note 75, the dissent advised that:
[w]ith the leeway conferred upon the States within which they may authorize or
proscribe abortion by statute, it would appear that, to avoid apparent or actual
inconsistencies in the law, any right of action created for the wrongful death of
an unborn child should be correlated with the provisions of the statute pertaining
to abortions.
Id. at
, 304 N.E.2d at 95.
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stated that "[w]ith respect to the state's important and legitimate interest
in potential life, the 'compelling' point is at viability. " 14
Previous New Mexico courts have stated that the wrongful death statute
considered by the Salazarcourt has several purposes, including promotion
of "safety of life and limb by making negligence that causes death costly
to the wrongdoer."".5 Courts in other states have found that "the paramount purpose of our wrongful death statutes

. . .

is the preservation of

human life.""' 6 Wrongful death statutes thus have a general purpose of
protecting life. The Roe Court also found that there is a state interest in
protecting potential life. It is therefore a logical extension of Roe to find
that wrongful death statutes also protect potential life.
The state interests in the second trimester of pregnancy are somewhat
dissimilar" 7 under the abortion and wrongful death statutes, but are not
conflicting. Roe did not preclude, but only limited, the state's interest in
the second trimester. It similarly did not preclude the state's interest in
the case of the wrongful death of a fetus. In view of this fact, Roe did
not preclude the state from protecting the unborn in the second trimester
under the wrongful death statutes. The Roe Court found that "[w]ith
respect to the State's important and legitimate interest in the health of
the mother, the 'compelling' point . . . is at approximately the end of

the first trimester. "" 8 The Court held that a state could at that time regulate
abortion procedures in a manner related to the protection of maternal
health. "9
New Mexico courts have recognized that a major purpose underlying
the adoption of wrongful death statutes involves promoting the "safety
of life.""'2 In addition, New Mexico courts have cited other purposes
served by wrongful death statutes, such as compensation' 2 ' and public
punishment and deterrence. 2 2 The Court in Roe, in acknowledging the
existence of an action for the wrongful death of a fetus, found it was
"one to vindicate the parents' interest. " 23 These findings emphasize the
state's interest in protecting life by deterring the potential wrongdoer.
The state's interests in protecting potential life and in deterring a po114. 410 U.S. at 163. The Court found that viability began at the third trimester. Id.
115. Stang v. Hertz Corp., 81 N.M. 348, 350-51, 467 P.2d 14, 16-17 (1970).
, 300 So. 2d at 356 (1974). The court
116. Eich v. Town of Gulf Shores, 293 Ala. at
permitted recovery for the wrongful death of a viable fetus because "[to deny recovery would
sanction the tortfeasor's wrongful act and would clearly negate the primary objective of the statute."
117. Under the abortion statute the state interest is in protecting the health of the mother. Under
the wrongful death statutes, the state has a more general interest in protecting all lives.
118. 410 U.S. at 163.
119. Id.
120. See notes 115-116 supra and accompanying text.
121. See Stang v. Hertz Corp., 81 N.M. at 350-51, 467 P.2d at 16-17; N.M. Stat. Ann. §412-3 (1978), see supra note 2 for the text of the statute.
122. See Trujillo v. Prince, 42 N.M. 337, 345, 78 P.2d 145, 150 (1938).
123. 410 U.S. at 162.
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tential tortfeasor under the wrongful death statute are as "compelling"
as are the state's interest in protecting potential life and in protecting the
mother's health under the abortion statutes. An apparent conflict of state
interests arises in the second trimester if a state attempts to protect potential life under the wrongful death statutes by threatening punishment,
but cannot provide that same protection under the abortion statutes by
preventing abortions. This conflict may be eliminated by the Supreme
Court's finding that under the abortion statutes, a woman has a personal
right of privacy which offsets the state's interest in protecting her health. 24
There is no such offsetting right in the wrongful death statutes, where a
tortfeasor clearly does not have a right to be exonerated for his wrongful
act.
Professor Kader stated that Roe can be used to expand recovery for
25
the wrongful death of a fetus injured in the first trimester of pregnancy. 1
He bases this interpretation on the assumption that Roe implicitly recognizes the existence throughout pregnancy of a legitimate state interest
in protecting "the potentiality of life," and that Roe only limits that interest26
in the context of protecting the woman's right to privacy or her health. 1
Therefore, the state can enforce tort liability for the death of a non-viable
fetus in the first and second trimesters within those limitations.' 27 While
it is agreed that the state can assert an interest in the second trimester,
the argument that such an interest can be asserted in the first trimester
assumes too much from what the Supreme Court says about the status
of the unborn. Although the Court "implicitly" recognized the existence
of the potentiality of life throughout pregancy, it clearly refused to protect
that existence when it held that a woman and her doctor could terminate
her pregnancy in the first trimester without any interference from the
state. 128
There would be an inherent conflict with the Roe decision if recovery
for wrongful death of a fetus were permitted in the first trimester. The
result would be that a tortfeasor would be liable for the death of a fetus
injured in the first trimester, but a woman could abort her fetus during
that time.' 29 This conflict is absent in the second trimester because the
Court did not preclude the existence of all the rights of the unborn as it
did in the first trimester.
124. Id. at 154.
125. Kader, supra note 57, at 663-64.
126. Id. at 664.
127. Id. at 665.
128. 410 U.S. at 164.
129. See Toth v. Goree, 65 Mich. App. 296, 304, 237 N.W.2d 297, 301 (1975), in which the
court held that a three-month-old fetus was not a "person" within the wrongful death statute. Id. at
__

237 N.W. 2d at 302.
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IV. CONCLUSION
Salazar v. St. Vincent Hospital was a case of first impression in New
Mexico. The court allowed recovery in an action for the wrongful death
of a viable fetus. The court's holding that a viable fetus is a "person"
under the New Mexico wrongful death statute was based on a tenuous
connection between that state statute and criminal statutes. Although such
a holding seems to conflict with the United States Supreme Court's decision in Roe v. Wade that a fetus is not a "person" under the fourteenth
amendment, the two findings are reconcilable. Furthermore, Roe provides
guidance to states which must decide whether to allow recovery for the
wrongful death of a fetus.
There should be no recovery in the first trimester because the Supreme
Court did not protect the potential life of the fetus by precluding abortions
in that period. Where the wrongful death of a viable fetus occurs during
the third trimester of pregnancy, the Salazar-Roe decisions may be viewed
as consistent in suggesting that recovery may be allowed. Recovery may
also be allowed if the fetus is injured in the second trimester. During that
period the Supreme Court does not deny the value of the fetus' life. There
is a strong state interest in punishing and deterring a tortfeasor in order
to protect potential life, as there is a strong state interest in regulating
abortion during the second trimester.
An application of the Roe analysis to wrongful death claims will provide
New Mexico courts with a more authoritative basis than that which was
used in Salazar for permitting recovery. It will also permit courts to
extend recovery into the second trimester. New Mexico courts and other
state courts should consider Roe in their decisions. Courts should rely on
Roe as authority, rather than on nebulous determinations of legislative
intent of 100 years ago or on definitions of "personhood." Using Roe as
precedent will establish one cohesive theory for permitting recovery for
the wrongful death of a fetus injured in the second and third trimesters
of pregnancy.
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